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Abstract—Consider the problem of mitigating the impact on
data integrity of phasor measurement units (PMUs) given a GPS
spoofing attack. We present a sparse error correction framework
to treat PMU measurements that are potentially corrupted due
to a GPS spoofing attack. We exploit the sparse nature of a GPS
spoofing attack, which is that only a small fraction of PMUs
are affected by the attack. We first present attack identifiability
conditions (in terms of network topology, PMU locations, and
the number of spoofed PMUs) under which data manipulation
by the spoofing attack is identifiable. The identifiability conditions
have important implications on how the locations of PMUs affect
their resilience to GPS spoofing attacks. To effectively correct
spoofed PMU data, we present a sparse error correction approach
wherein computation tasks are decomposed into smaller zones
to ensure scalability. We present experimental results obtained
from numerical simulations with the IEEE RTS-96 test network
to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
Index Terms—Phasor measurement unit, GPS spoofing attack,
sparse error correction
I. INTRODUCTION
PHASOR measurement units (PMUs), which are equippedwith clocks synchronized by global positioning systems
(GPS), or, more broadly, global navigation satellite systems
(GNSS), provide direct measurements of voltage and current
phasors at a much faster rate than the legacy SCADA sys-
tem [1]. Due to this enriched measurement quality, there has
been a wide interest in developing approaches to leverage
PMU measurements for real-time power grid monitoring,
protection, and control [2], [3]. While several PMU-based
approaches showed improved performance compared to the
legacy approaches [4], [5], those promises can be realized only
if the data integrity of PMUs can be ensured.
Compared to legacy measurement devices, PMUs are
equipped with more sophisticated security protocols, and thus
it is considered difficult for adversaries to tamper with the
data by directly compromising data authentication protocols
of PMUs [6]. Nevertheless, the dependency of PMUs on
civilian GPS signals for clock synchronization renders PMU
measurements vulnerable to GPS signal spoofing attacks,
which can be successfully launched by an adversary with small
resource demand. The cyber attackers can easily deploy GPS
transmitters to broadcast counterfeit GPS signals, which can
manipulate the time estimation at the target PMU’s GPS re-
ceiver [7], [8]. Erroneous time reference successively induces
errors in phase angle measurements of the tampered PMU. In
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practice, an attacker with limited resources can spoof only a
few PMUs at a time. Hence the impact of spoofing attacks on
PMU measurements is sparse in nature, i.e., we can assume
the fraction of PMU measurements corrupted by the spoofing
attacks to be small.
In this paper, we exploit the sparse nature of the GPS
spoofing attack to recover affected PMU measurements. We
first derive identifiability conditions for GPS spoofing attacks,
under which a spoofing attack is fundamentally identifiable.
This identifiability assessment portrays the vulnerability of the
PMU network to GPS spoofing attacks and can be used to
determine PMU placement that is resilient to GPS spoofing
attacks. Then, we develop a sparse error correction algorithm
to effectively correct potentially spoofed PMU measurements.
The decomposability of the PMU measurement model is lever-
aged to make major steps of the algorithm performed based
on only local models and measurements thereby ensuring
the scalability of the algorithm. The experiment results on
IEEE RTS-96 test network show that the proposed approach
outperforms other benchmark algorithms when the number of
spoofed PMUs is moderate.
A. Related work
Several approaches have been proposed in the literature
to enhance the resilience of GPS time estimation procedure
at a single PMU against spoofing attacks by developing a
new GPS receiver architecture [9]–[11] or a new robust time
estimation algorithm [12], [13]. Gong et al. in [9] proposed
a spoofing detection algorithm by leveraging multiple GPS
receivers per PMU, while authors in [10] exploit the networked
and static nature of PMUs in close proximity, to propose a
robust receiver architecture. Also in [11] the authors leverage
the characteristics of a static receiver network to constrain the
adversary’s freedom of GPS spoofing. The main focus of all
the aforementioned techniques is on designing robust receiver
architectures that harden the spoofing attacks. On the other
hand, authors in [12], [13] propose robust time estimation
techniques such that time estimation in PMUs become resilient
to spoofing attacks. Authors in [12] propose a direct time
estimation technique using the maximum likelihood approach.
Work in [13] couples this time estimation technique with
spatially dispersed multiple-receivers to improve the resilience
against spoofing attacks. All the strategies in this category
either require additional infrastructure in terms of external
clocks and multiple GPS receiver antennas or require a net-
work of GPS receivers in the vicinity of the PMU of interest.
The aforementioned works focused on robustifying the time
estimation procedure at a single PMU. In the meanwhile, sev-
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2eral works in the literature [14]–[19] demonstrated that GPS
spoofing attacks on PMUs can be more effectively mitigated
by leveraging how phasor measurements from different PMUs
are correlated and how they are related to the underlying power
system state due to the interconnectedness of the grid. Pradhan
et al. in [14] present a dynamic state estimation from PMU
measurements that is resilient to spoofing attacks, by devising
a generalized likelihood-based hypothesis testing to detect
the location and magnitude of the spoofing attacks. A major
limitation here is that it assumes that an accurate estimate of
the time of the attack is known a priori. In [15] the authors
mathematically model the spoofed measurements and propose
an algorithm to detect and correct GPS spoofing attack on a
single PMU in the network. Risbud et al in [16], [17] leverage
a measurement model that accounts for GPS spoofing attacks
on multiple PMUs and develop an alternating minimization
algorithm for joint estimation of the state and the attack.
Similarly the authors of [18], [19] attempt to jointly estimate
the states and phase angle errors by solving weighted least
squares problem. However, joint estimation of state and phase
angle biases, without an additional assumption on the state
or angle bias variables, is ill-posed in that there exist many
distinct solutions that can fit PMU measurements optimally.
In this paper, we present a sparse correction approach to
correct PMU data in the presence of GPS spoofing attacks.
We exploit the PMU measurement model information (i.e.,
the mathematical relation between PMU measurements and
the system state) to identify the phase angle biases in PMU
measurements introduced by spoofing attacks. In order to
avoid the aforementioned ill-posedness issue, we impose a
practical constraint on the attack that only a small fraction
of PMUs are subject to spoofing attacks at a given time.
Our contributions are: (i) formulating PMU data correction
under GPS spoofing attacks as a sparse optimization problem;
(ii) analyzing the fundamental identifiability of the attacks
and present conditions on attack identifiability in terms of
network topology, PMU locations and the number of spoofed
PMUs; (iii) developing a computationally efficient iterative
greedy algorithm to estimate the attack and correct PMU
measurements; and (iv) validating the approach by defending
the RTS-96 power network against multiple GPS spoofing
attacks under both observable and unobservable PMU settings.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Throughout the paper, boldface lowercase letters (e.g., x)
denote vectors, boldface uppercase letters (e.g., X) denote
matrices and script letters (e.g., X,A) denote sets. The lp norm
of x is denoted by ‖x‖p. Furthermore, |x|, ∠x, and x∗ denote
the absolute value, the angle, and the Hermitian transpose of
the complex number x, respectively. Moreover, for a sparse
vector x, supp(x) denotes the support of x, which is the set of
indices of nonzero entries in x. In addition, R(H) and N(H)
denote the range space and the null space of H respectively.
A. PMU measurement model
A power network topology can be represented by an undi-
rected graph G = (V,E) where V = {1, 2, ..., N} denotes the
set of N buses in the network and E denotes the set of branches
(either transmission lines or transformers) interconnecting
these buses, specifically, {i, l} ∈ E if and only if there exists an
energized line connecting bus i and bus l. PMUs are installed
in a selected subset of buses T ⊆ V where total number of
PMUs in the network is denoted by K (i.e., |T| = K).
Let z ∈ Cm denote the PMU measurement vector which
consists of measurements from all the PMUs deployed in the
network and x = [x1, x2, . . . , xN ]T ∈ CN denote the system
state vector where xi represents the voltage phasor at bus i. If
a PMU is installed at bus i (i.e., i ∈ T), z would contain the
measurement of the voltage phasor at bus i, which we denote
by zVi :
zVi = xi (1)
In addition, PMU at bus i also provides measurements of
outgoing current phasors in a subset of lines incident to bus
i. Suppose Ni denotes the set of neighbours of bus i in the
topology G, and Mi ⊆ Ni denotes a subset of neighbors of
bus i such that the current phasor of line {i, l} with l ∈Mi is
measured by PMU at bus i. The phasor measurement of the
line current from bus i to bus l ∈Mi, denoted by zIil , can be
given as below:
zIil = yil(xi − xl) + j
bsil
2
xi
= (yil + j
bsil
2
)xi − yilxl ,
(2)
where yil is the series admittance of the line {i, l}, and bsil is
its line charging susceptance.
From (1) and (2), we can see that each entry of z is
linearly related to the system state x. Therefore, the linear
measurement equation, incorporating the measurement noise,
can be obtained as follows:
z = Hx + e, (3)
where H ∈ Cm×N is a linear operator determined based on
the network topology and line parameters according to (1)
and (2), and e ∈ Cm is complex Gaussian noise.
B. Attack model
A GPS spoofing attack on a PMU can shift the time
reference of the PMU, which the PMU uses to compute the
phase angle measurements. Assuming that the frequencies
of voltage and current waveforms are synchronized to the
nominal frequency (e.g., 60 Hz in the United States), the
bias in the time reference injected by the spoofing attack
would cause a common phase angle bias to all the phase angle
measurements collected by the PMU [8], [15].
Suppose that spoofing attack introduces a phase angle bias
αk to all of the phase angle measurements from PMU k
installed at bus i . Then, we can model the spoofed voltage and
current measurements, denoted by z¯Vi and z¯Iil respectively, as
follows:
z¯Vi = e
jαkzVi (4a)
z¯Iil = e
jαkzIil , l ∈Mi (4b)
If we use zk ∈ Cmk and z¯k ∈ Cmk to denote the intact
measurements and the spoofed measurements from the PMU
3k respectively, the spoofed measurements from PMU k can be
simply written as follows:
z¯k = e
jαkzk (5)
This can be generalized to model PMU measurements from
the entire PMU network as shown below,
z¯1
z¯2
...
z¯K
 =

ejα1Im1 0 . . . 0
0 ejα2Im2 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . ejαK ImK


z1
z2
...
zK
,
or equivalently,
z¯ = Φ(α)z, (6)
where the diagonal matrix Φ(α) denotes the attack structure
using α , [α1, α2, . . . , αK ]T and Imk ∈ Rmk×mk denotes
the identity matrix. The angle shift αk is nonzero if the mea-
surements from PMU k are spoofed, and it is zero otherwise.
This model is equivalent to the model employed in [16].
By combining (3) with (6) we can obtain the model for PMU
measurements potentially subject to a GPS spoofing attack:
z¯ = Φ(α)(Hx + e) (7)
C. Problem statement
Given a potentially spoofed measurement vector z¯ from the
measurement model (7), we aim to estimate α such that we
can recover the original measurement vector z. Unfortunately,
many α’s are fundamentally not identifiable from z¯. In par-
ticular, given noiseless PMU measurements z¯ generated from
some attack α and state x, there can exist some α¯ 6= α and
x¯ satisfying:
z¯ = Φ(α¯)Hx¯, or equivalently, Φ−1(α¯)z¯ ∈ R(H), (8)
i.e., the measurements might be consistent with another attack
scenario described by α¯. Relying solely on the spoofed
measurements z¯, it is impossible to detect which one is the
true attack among the consistent attack scenarios.
In order to alleviate this challenge and accommodate effec-
tive attack identification, we employ a practical assumption
that only a few PMUs in T are spoofed by the adversary.
In other words, α is a sparse vector, or equivalently, only
a few αk’s are nonzero. By leveraging the sparse attack
assumption, we aim to obtain an accurate estimate of α based
on observation of a potentially spoofed measurement vector z¯,
which follows the measurement model (7). Note that the state
vector x is unknown. Once we obtain an estimate of α, we
can use it in conjunction with the attack model (6) to recover
the original measurement vector z.
Note that if the attack vector α is not sparse enough
and its entries are designed in an elaborate manner, then α
might not be fundamentally identifiable in the sparse error
correction regime. We formalize the attack identifiability in
Section III and present a rigorous identifiability analysis of
spoofing attacks. The results explain how the network topology
and PMU locations affect fundamental identifiability of GPS
spoofing attacks and therein can be leveraged to assess the
vulnerability of power grid to GPS spoofing attacks by simply
analyzing the grid topology and PMU locations (e.g., what is
the minimum number of PMUs an attacker needs to spoof to
be able to launch an unidentifiable attack). In Section IV, we
present a sparse error correction algorithm that can be used to
effectively estimate spoofing attacks that are identifiable.
III. IDENTIFIABILITY OF SPARSE SPOOFING ATTACKS
Suppose there exist α and α¯ such that they are consistent
with the noiseless PMU measurements, and α¯ has a fewer
number of nonzero entries than α. Since the sparse recovery
algorithms inherently pick the most sparse solution to a prob-
lem [20], identifying the true sparse attack vector α becomes
fundamentally impossible in such a situation. Based on this
intuition, the attack identifiability can be defined as below:
Definition III.1. An attack α is said to be identifiable for a
state x if there does not exist α¯ 6= α such that
(i) ‖α¯‖0 ≤ ‖α‖0, and
(ii) Φ(α)Hx = Φ(α¯)Hx¯, for some x¯, or equivalently,
Φ−1(α¯)(Φ(α)Hx) ∈ R(H)
Having formally defined identifiability, we perform the
attack identifiability analysis to characterize the conditions
for attack identifiability in terms of network topology, PMU
locations and spoofed PMU locations. A major challenge in
the identifiability analysis is that the spoofed measurement
model (7) is nonlinear and involves complex-valued variables.
To circumvent this challenge, we first introduce an alternative
measurement vector w¯ that can be obtained by applying
a transformation T (·) to z¯ and is linearly related to the
voltage phase angles and the attack vector α. In the following
proposition, we define the transformation T (·).
Proposition III.1. Let w¯ be a real-valued vector consisting
of the following quantities:
{∠z¯Vi ,∆θil, for all i ∈ T and l ∈Mi},
where ∆θil = (θi− θl) and θi denotes the voltage state angle
at bus i. Then, there exists a mapping T (.) such that w¯ =
T (z¯). Specifically, the entries of w¯ can be obtained from z¯ as
follows:
w¯∠Vi = ∠z¯Vi (9a)
w¯∆θil = ∠(
(y∗il − j b
s
il
2 )|z¯Vi |2 − z¯Vi z¯∗Iil
y∗il
) (9b)
Proof. See Appendix I of the supplementary material.
Unlike the original measurement vector z¯, the alternative
measurement vector w¯ = T (z¯) can be shown to be linearly
related to the voltage phase angle vector θ ∈ RN which
comprises all θi, ∀i ∈ V, and the attack vector α. First, we
can use (1) and (4a) to derive that,
w¯∠Vi = ∠z¯Vi = ∠(ejαkzVi) = ∠|xi|ej(θi+αk) = αk + θi,
(10)
where αk is the phase angle bias introduced by the attack on
PMU k installed in bus i. By concatenating w¯∠Vi for all the
buses with PMUs, we obtain the vector w¯∠V , which is the
vector of voltage phase angle measurements in the presence
of a spoofing attack:
w¯∠V = H∠V θ + α. (11)
4The matrix H∠V ∈ RK×N is determined using (10), where
each row corresponds to a voltage angle measurement, and
each column corresponds to a particular bus in the network.
Suppose that row j of H∠V corresponds to the measurement
w¯∠Vi from the PMU in bus i. Then entry (j, i) in H∠V is set
to one and the rest of the entries in row j are set to zeros.
Similarly, from the definition of w¯∆θil in Proposition III.1,
w¯∆θil = θi − θl (12)
Thus, concatenating w¯∆θil for all i ∈ T and l ∈Mi, we obtain
the vector w¯∆ consisting of voltage angle differences across
all the lines measured by PMUs, which can be mathematically
written as below:
w¯∆ = H∆θ (13)
Each row of H∆ ∈ R(m−K)×N corresponds to voltage angle
difference measurements computed using (12) and each col-
umn corresponds to a particular bus in the network. Suppose
that row j of H∆ corresponds to w¯∆θil for some bus i ∈ T
and l ∈ Mi. Then all the entries of row j are set to zeros
except for (j, i) and (j, l) entries of the matrix H∆, which are
set to one and negative one, respectively.
Hence now we can write the alternative measurement model
using (11) and (13) as follows.
T (z¯) = w¯ =
[
w¯∠V
w¯∆
]
=
[
H∠V
H∆
]
θ +
[
α
0
]
(14)
A. Identifiability analysis
In this section, we perform identifiability analysis based on
the alternative measurement model derived above. Recall that
identifiability is defined by Definition III.1, which states that if
a GPS spoofing attack α is not identifiable from measurements
z¯ generated by (α,x), then there exists α¯ 6= α such that
‖α¯‖0 ≤ ‖α‖0 and,
z¯ = Φ(α)Hx = Φ(α¯)Hx¯, (15)
for some x¯. Hence, by applying transformation T (.) defined
in Proposition III.1 on (15), we can see that,
T (Φ(α)Hx) = T (Φ(α¯)Hx¯),
or equivalently,[
H∠V
H∆
]
θ +
[
α
0
]
=
[
H∠V
H∆
]
θ¯ +
[
α¯
0
]
, (16)
where θ¯ denotes the angles of the state x¯, precisely θ¯i = ∠x¯i.
This implies that if the attack α is not identifiable, then there
exists α¯ 6= α such that ‖α¯‖0 ≤ ‖α‖0 and[
H∠V
H∆
]
(θ¯− θ) =
[
α− α¯
0
]
, for some θ and θ¯. (17)
Since this implies that (θ¯ − θ) is in the null space of
H∆, (17) is equivalent to,
α− α¯ ∈ R(H∠V B∆), (18)
where B∆ forms a basis for N(H∆). The contrapositive of
this statement directly induces the following proposition.
Proposition III.2. An attack α is identifiable for any state x
if there does not exist α¯ 6= α such that
1
2
3
4
5
(a) G
1
2
3
4
5
(b) GT
H∆ =

(1) (2) (4)
... (3) (5)
(w¯∆θ21 ) −1 1 0
... 0 0
(w¯∆θ41 ) −1 0 1
... 0 0
(w¯∆θ53 ) 0 0 0
... −1 1
 H∠V =

(1) (2) (4)
... (3) (5)
(w¯∠V2 ) 0 1 0
... 0 0
(w¯∠V4 ) 0 0 1
... 0 0
(w¯∠V5 ) 0 0 0
... 0 1

BT∆ =
[ (1) (2) (4) (3) (5)
(zone 1) 1 1 1 0 0
(zone 2) 0 0 0 1 1
]
Fig. 1. Illustration of zones using a simple power network. The PMUs
deployed on T = {2, 4, 5} measure outgoing current flow from 2 to 1, 4 to 1
and 5 to 3. Measurement graph GT = ({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {(2, 1), (4, 1), (3, 5)}),
consists of two zones where V(1)
T
= {1, 2, 4} and V(2)
T
= {3, 5}.
(i) ‖α¯‖0 ≤ ‖α‖0
(ii) α− α¯ ∈ R(H∠V B∆)
This proposition provides a sufficient condition for identifi-
ability of α in terms of the column space of H∠V B∆. Candes
and Tao presented in [21] a theoretical result that can be used
to further simplify the sufficient condition in Proposition III.2
to a condition in terms of the sparsity of α. By applying
Lemma 1.7 in [21] to the conditions in Proposition III.2, we
can obtain the following lemma.
Lemma III.1. An attack α is identifiable for any state x if,
‖α‖0 < 12 Cospark(H∠V B∆),
where cospark of a matrix A is defined as,
Cospark(A) = min
h∈R(A),h6=0
‖h‖0
Proof. See Appendix II-A of the supplementary material
Even though finding the cospark of a matrix is generally an
NP-hard problem, the special structures of the matrices H∆
and H∠V make it possible to derive the cospark of H∠V B∆
exactly in terms of the locations and the number of PMUs in
the network. In order to understand this underlying structure
of the matrices, we first define the concept of a zone in the
power network, which we identify as a region of the network
measured by a subset of PMUs whose measurements are
correlated via sharing of some common latent state variables.
Zones in a Power network: For each i ∈ T, we define
the graph Gi = (Vi,Ei) such that Vi = {i} ∪ Mi and
Ei ⊂ E consists of the edges {i, l}, ∀ l ∈ Mi. In other
words, Gi is the subgraph of the topology consisting of all
the lines measured by the PMU located at bus i. Then, we
use GT to denote the union of all Gi’s with i ∈ T, i.e.,
GT = (VT,ET) = ( ∪
j∈T
Vj , ∪
j∈T
Ej). Since GT depicts the region
in the power network measured by the PMUs placed in the
set of buses T, we refer GT as the measurement graph of
PMUs in T. Figure 1a and Figure 1b illustrate a simple power
network with five buses, four branches, and three PMUs, and
the measurement graph GT where T = {2, 4, 5}, respectively.
Given the measurement graph GT , we define zones as
connected components of graph GT as follows. We say that bus
5i and bus j in GT are reachable from each other if there exists
a path1 in GT that has i and j as the end points. We partition
the vertex set VT into V
(1)
T , . . . ,V
(Γ)
T such that two vertices i
and j are in the same V(γ)T if and only if they are reachable
from each other. We refer to the set of buses in V(γ)T as Zone
γ. For instance, in Figure 1b, we have two zones V(1)T and
V
(2)
T ; each of them corresponds to one of the two connected
components of GT . This partitioning in the vertex domain
naturally partition the set of PMUs T into T(1), . . . ,T(Γ),
where we use T(γ) to denote the set of buses with PMUs
in Zone γ, i.e., T(γ) = T ∩ V(γ)T . Note that the concept of
zone defined in this paper is different from the more popular
concept of observable island 2 [22], [23]; specifically, a single
observable island can contain multiple zones. For instance,
the entire network in Figure 1a is observable based on PMU
measurements, but as Figure 1b shows this observable island
contains two zones.
From the PMU measurement model defined in (1) and (2),
the PMU measurements from Zone γ denoted by z¯(γ), depend
only on state variables associated with buses in Zone γ, which
we denote by x(γ). Therefore, the spoofed PMU measurement
model (6) and (7) has the following block structure:z¯
(1)
...
z¯(Γ)
 =
Φ1(α
(1)) . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 . . . ΦΓ(α
(Γ))

H
(1) . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 . . . H(Γ)

x
(1)
...
x(Γ)
,
(19)
where α(γ) denotes the sub-vector of α that represents the
angle biases introduced to the PMUs in Zone γ. Moreover,
Φγ(α
(γ)) is a diagonal matrix which denotes the submatrix
of Φ(α) corresponding to Zone γ, and H(γ) denotes the
submatrix of H that represents the linear relation between
PMU measurements and states in Zone γ. The decomposed
spoofed measurement model per zone can be given as below:
z¯(γ) = Φγ(α
(γ))H(γ)x(γ). (20)
Similarly, the linear model (14) of the alternative measure-
ments can be decomposed in to zones as follows:
w¯
(1)
∠V
...
w¯
(Γ)
∠V
w¯
(1)
∆
...
w¯
(Γ)
∆

=

H
(1)
∠V . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 . . . H
(Γ)
∠V
H
(1)
∆ . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 . . . H
(Γ)
∆

θ
(1)
...
θ(Γ)
 ,+

α(1)
...
α(Γ)
0
...
0

, (21)
where H(γ)∠V ∈ RK
(γ)×N(γ) and H(γ)∆ ∈ R(m
(γ)−K(γ))×N(γ)
denote the submatrices of H∠V and H∆ that represent the
linear relation of alternative measurements w¯(γ)∠V and w¯
(γ)
∆
with voltage state angles in Zone γ, respectively. Note that
m(γ),K(γ) and N (γ) represents the number of measurements
in Zone γ, the number of PMUs in Zone γ and the number
of busses in Zone γ respectively. The decomposed alternative
measurement model (21) implies that H∠V and H∆ are block
1Path is a sequence of distinct edges that join a sequence of distinct vertices.
2An observable island is a region in the network that makes all the states
in the region observable from the measurements collected within the region
matrices with off-diagonal blocks equal to zero and each
diagonal block corresponds to a zone in the network.
Due to this special block structure of H∆ described in (21)
and the sparsity pattern of each block in this matrix imposed
by (13), we can derive the basis for the null space of H∆ as
given in the following proposition:
Proposition III.3. The basis for N(H∆) is a block matrix
B∆ ∈ RN×Γ,
B∆ =

B
(1)
∆ 0 . . .0
0 B
(2)
∆ . . .0
... . . .
...
0 0 . . .B
(Γ)
∆
, where B(γ)∆ = 1N(γ) .
Here 1N(γ) denotes the N (γ)− dimensional vector with all
entries equal to one.
Proof. See Appendix II-B of the supplementary material
Since both H∠V and B∆ are matrices with the special block
structure, H∠V B∆ also takes the same block structure, i.e.,
H∠V B∆ =

H
(1)
∠V B
(1)
∆ 0 . . .0
0 H
(2)
∠V B
(2)
∆ . . .0
... . . .
...
0 0 . . .H
(Γ)
∠V B
(Γ)
∆
 , (22)
where H(γ)∠V B
(γ)
∆ denotes the diagonal block corresponding to
Zone γ. By leveraging this special block structure of H∠V B∆,
we can derive the following lemma:
Lemma III.2.
Cospark (H∠V B∆) = min
γ∈{1,2,...,Γ}
Cospark(H(γ)∠V B
(γ)
∆ )
Proof. See Appendix II-C of the supplementary material
Furthermore, using Proposition III.3 together with the struc-
ture of H∠V imposed by (21), we can obtain the cospark of
H
(γ)
∠V B
(γ)
∆ in terms of the number of PMUs in each zone.
Lemma III.3. For all zones γ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Γ} in the network,
Cospark (H(γ)∠V B
(γ)
∆ ) = K
(γ)
Proof. See Appendix II-D of the supplementary material
Combining Lemma III.1, Lemma III.2 and Lemma III.3 we
obtain a sufficient condition for the identifiability of α in terms
of Kmin, which is the smallest number of PMUs in any zone
of the power network.
Theorem III.1. An attack α is identifiable for any state x if,
‖α‖0 ≤ dKmin2 − 1e,
where Kmin = min
γ∈{1,2,...,Γ}
K(γ).
In addition, given any state x, there exists an unidentifiable
attack α for x with the sparsity level ‖α‖0 = dKmin2 −1e+1.
Proof. See Appendix II-E of the supplementary material
Suppose we measure the size of a zone in the network by
the number of PMUs in it. Theorem III.1 implies that if the
number of spoofed PMUs in the entire network is less than half
of the number of PMUs in the smallest zone, such attacks are
identifiable. Furthermore, we have proved that if the number
6Zone 1
Zone 2
Fig. 2. Observable PMU placement in IEEE RTS-96 test network and the
two zones induced by these PMUs. PMUs in Zone 1 and Zone 2 are indicated
by green and blue dots respectively, and their corresponding bus numbers.
of spoofed PMUs exceed this threshold by 1, then there exists
an unidentifiable attack. By leveraging the block structure of
H∠V B∆ (22) and decomposability of the model (21), we were
able to derive the following theorem providing us with a more
relaxed condition that implies identifiability of the attack:
Theorem III.2. An attack α is identifiable for any state x if,
‖α(γ)‖0 ≤ dK(γ)2 − 1e ∀γ ∈ {1, . . . ,Γ}.
In addition, given any state x there exists an unidentifiable
attack α that has the sparsity level ‖α(γ¯)‖0 = dK(γ¯)2 −1e+1,
for some γ¯ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Γ} and ‖α(γ)‖0 ≤ dK(γ)2 − 1e for
γ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Γ} \ {γ¯}.
Proof. See Appendix II-F of the supplementary material
This theorem states that as long as the number of spoofed
PMUs in each zone is less than half of the number of PMUs in
the zone, the attack is identifiable. Furthermore if there exists
at least one zone where the sparsity condition is not satisfied
then there exists an unidentifiable attack.
Leveraging identifiability analysis to improve grid re-
silience: Theorem III.1 implies that the smaller Kmin, the
more vulnerable the grid is to spoofing attacks in that the at-
tacker can launch an unidentifiable spoofing attack by spoofing
a smaller number of PMUs. This implies that when we allocate
PMUs (or add an additional PMU to the grid), we can improve
the grid resilience by maximizing Kmin, i.e., the number of
PMUs in the zone containing the smallest number of PMUs.
Figure 2 illustrates this idea with an example PMU allo-
cation for the RTS-96 test network. This PMU allocation has
21 PMUs that naturally induces two zones in the network,
with 7 and 14 PMUs respectively, where Kmin = 7. Based
on Theorem III.1, if the number of spoofed PMUs is less than
or equal to three, then the attack is identifiable regardless of
the locations of the spoofed PMUs. Suppose that the operator
combines Zone 2 with Zone 1 by deploying an additional
PMU such that Kmin will be increased to 22. The new PMU
placement ensures that the network is resilient to any spoofing
attack with less than 11 spoofed PMUs. Thus the operators
can significantly reduce the vulnerability of the network to
spoofing attacks at a small increase in the cost.
IV. PMU DATA CORRECTION ALGORITHM
In this section, we present a sparse error correction algo-
rithm to mitigate GPS spoofing. Note that we can rewrite the
spoofed measurement (7) as follows:
Φ−1(α)z¯ = Hx + e. (23)
The above equation implies that with the true α, Φ−1(α)z¯
would reside very close to the column space of H, where the
distance will be due to a small perturbation introduced by the
measurement noise. In particular, if we project Φ−1(α)z¯ onto
R(H), the projection residue r can be given as below,
r := (Im −PH)Φ−1(α)z¯, (24)
where PH denotes the projection operator for projection on
to the column space of H. Then, r is equivalent to the pro-
jection of only the measurement noise e onto the orthogonal
complement of R(H) because, by plugging (23) in (24),
r = (Im −PH)(Hx + e) = (Im −PH)e . (25)
We propose to estimate α by finding the sparsest estimate
of α that makes the squared magnitude of the projection
residue (24) no greater than a pre-set threshold τ :
αˆ = arg min
α
‖α‖0
subject to ‖(Im −PH)Φ−1(α)z¯)‖22 ≤ τ ,
(26)
The threshold τ is set such that ‖(Im−PH)e‖22 ≤ τ is satisfied
with high probability.
We propose a greedy iterative algorithm to solve (26)
efficiently, which has a similar structure with existing residue-
based greedy algorithms such as orthogonal matching pur-
suit [24]. In each iteration of the algorithm, we evaluate the
projection residue (24) based on the estimated set of spoofed
PMUs and the attack vector estimate (from the previous
iteration), add a PMU with the largest normalized projection
residue to the estimated set of spoofed PMU, and update
the estimate of the attack vector α accordingly by solving
a nonlinear least squares problem with a support constraint
representing the estimated set of spoofed PMUs. The detailed
pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1. Note that ri ∈ Cmi
denotes the projection residue of measurements from the PMU
at bus i ∈ T.
Scalable spoofing correction algorithm: Steps 5 and 6 of
Algorithm 1 are the most computationally heavy steps in each
iteration. We exploit the decomposibility of the measurement
model to solve these steps in a computationally efficient
manner. From the decomposed measurement model (19) we
can infer that Φ−1(α) and (Im − PH) are block matrices,
wherein off-diagonal blocks are equal to zero matrices and
each diagonal block corresponds to a zone in the network.
Hence Step 5 of Algorithm 1 is equivalent to,
αˆ = arg min
α:
supp(α)⊆A[itr]
Γ∑
γ=1
‖(Im(γ) −PH(γ))Φ−1γ (α(γ))z¯(γ))‖22.
(27)
This optimization can be solved independently per zone, i.e.,
αˆ(γ) = arg min
α(γ):
supp(α(γ))⊆A(γ),[itr]
‖(Im(γ) −PH(γ))Φ−1γ (α(γ))z¯(γ))‖22,
(28)
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Init.: αˆ = 0, r[0] = (Im −PH)Φ−1(αˆ)z¯,A[0] = ∅, itr = 1
1: while ‖r[itr−1]‖22 > τ do
2: Compute normalized residue magnitudes:
r˜i =
‖r[itr−1]i ‖22
mi
, ∀ i ∈ T \A[itr−1]
3: Select the largest normalized residue magnitude:
i∗ = arg max
i∈T\A[itr−1]
r˜i
4: Update the support of α:
A[itr] ← A[itr−1] ∪ {i∗}
5: Compute the estimate αˆ:
αˆ = arg min
α:supp(α)⊆A[itr]
‖(Im −PH)Φ−1(α)z¯‖22.
6: Update the residual
r[itr] = (Im −PH)Φ−1(αˆ)z¯
7: itr = itr + 1
8: end while
9: Data correction: zˆ = Φ−1(αˆ)z¯
Output: αˆ and zˆ
where A(γ),[itr] is the subset of the elements of A[itr] which
corresponds to Zone γ. Let γ∗ be the zone that contains bus
i∗ selected in Step 2 of the algorithm. Since A(γ),[itr] =
A(γ),[itr−1] for γ 6= γ∗, αˆ(γ) at iteration itr remains un-
changed from the previous iteration for all γ 6= γ∗. The update
on α happens only at Zone γ∗, as given below:
αˆ(γ
∗) = arg min
α(γ∗):
supp(α(γ
∗))⊆A(γ∗),[itr]
‖(Im(γ∗) −PH(γ∗))Φ−1γ∗ (α(γ
∗))z¯(γ
∗))‖22,
(29)
Therefore, Step 5 reduces to solving a least squares problem
for only one zone, γ∗.
Similarly, since only update of αˆ happens at αˆ(γ
∗), the
residue update at Step 6 of Algorithm 1 simplifies to,
r(γ),[itr] =
{
(Im(γ∗) −PH(γ∗))Φ−1γ∗ (αˆ(γ
∗))z¯(γ
∗) γ = γ∗
r(γ),[itr−1] ∀ γ 6= γ∗
(30)
where r(γ),[itr] denotes the sub-vector of r[itr] corresponding
to Zone γ. Therefore the computations in Steps 5 and 6
of the algorithm are reduced to single-zone updates. This
significantly reduces the computational complexity of the
algorithm and makes it scalable.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed
PMU data correction algorithm on the IEEE RTS-96 test
network [25], which consists of 73 buses and 120 branches.
PMU placement: We evaluate our data correction algorithm
on both observable and unobservable PMU placements. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the observable PMU placement setting which
consists of 21 PMUs. As described in Figure 2 this placement
setting naturally induces two zones in the network, with 7
PMUs in Zone 1 and 14 PMUs in Zone 2. Furthermore, we
obtained an unobservable PMU network by removing PMUs
at buses 303, 103, and 316 in the observable placement, which
results in a network with two zones, having 5 PMUs in Zone
1 and 13 PMUs in Zone 2. This causes around 15% of the
buses in the network to become unobservable.
Spoofed measurement generation: We test the proposed
data correction algorithm on measurements generated accord-
ing to (7) by sampling the state x from a gaussian distribution
with mean set to a known snapshot state and standard devia-
tions of voltage magnitudes and phase angles set to 0.01 p.u.
and 5.73 degrees, respectively. Given that the percentage of
the spoofed PMUs is set to A%, in each Monte Carlo run, we
selected A% of PMUs from each zone uniformly at random
and manipulated their phase angle measurements according
to (7). The magnitude of attack angle shift αk for a spoofed
PMU k is sampled from a uniform distribution in the range of
(0.8µ, 1.2µ) where µ is the attack mean, which we set to 20
degrees for our experiments. The sign of the non zero attack
angle shift αk is selected uniformly at random.
Benchmark algorithms: We compare the performance of
the proposed approach with two existing benchmark algo-
rithms, Risbud et al. [16] and Vanfretti et al. [18]. Risbud et
al. [16] presents an alternating minimization algorithm for
joint state estimation and attack reconstruction. This algorithm
is designed to operate on networks that are observable from
the PMU measurements 3. Vanfretti et al. [18] develops a
state estimation technique based on PMU measurements by
incorporating potential phase bias errors in PMU measure-
ments 4. This algorithm is designed for decentralized operation
wherein it can be independently applied to correct PMU data
in observable islands within an unobservable network.
Results: We first present the results for observable PMU
placement setting shown in Figure 2, where an equal per-
centage of PMUs are spoofed from Zone 1 and Zone 2.
For a performance metric, we employ the largest magnitude
entry of the attack estimation error vector (αˆ − α), i.e.,
‖αˆ − α‖∞ = max
i={1...,K}
|αˆi − αi|. Table I presents the
median, standard deviation, and the maximum value of this
metric from 100 Monte Carlo runs, for various percentages
of the spoofed PMUs and for an observable PMU placement
setting. The medians and the standard deviations indicate that
the proposed sparse error correction approach significantly
outperforms the benchmarks on average. In the meanwhile,
the maximum error metrics observed among 100 Monte Carlo
runs imply that our approach is more reliable compared to the
benchmarks. For instance, the error metric remains smaller
than 2.1 degrees for our approach in all Monte Carlo runs and
all experiment scenarios, but for the benchmarks, the error
metric can grow even larger than 12 degrees for some worst
case attack scenarios. Table II presents the results for an attack
carried out on an unobservable PMU network, where the rest
of the attack is designed similarly to the experiments with the
observable network. The results show the similar trend as the
results for the observable case. In all of the above experiments
3The authors in [16] extend their algorithm to networks unobservable by
PMU measurements by augmenting both PMU and SCADA measurements.
Since our focus is on PMU data correction, our comparison is only with their
algorithm that uses only PMU measurements
4We set PMU 102 as the ”reference bus” defined in the paper [18]. This
PMU is assumed to be intact from PMU attacks
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COMPARISON OF
(
MEDIAN ± STANDARD DEVIATION
2
)
, AND THE MAXIMUM OF
l∞ NORM OF THE ESTIMATION ERROR OF α FROM 100 MONTE CARLO
RUNS, FOR OBSERVABLE PMU PLACEMENT SETTING, IN DEGREES
Spoofed
PMU % Proposed Risbud et al.[16]
Vanfretti et al.
[18]
10%
0.200 ± 0.165
(Max.: 1.590)
1.360 ± 0.819
(Max.: 9.999)
3.415 ± 1.166
(Max.: 13.588)
20%
0.580 ± 0.163
(Max.: 1.353)
4.393 ± 1.812
(Max.: 20.418)
3.964 ± 1.359
(Max.: 14.546)
30%
0.789 ± 0.165
(Max.: 2.095)
6.414 ± 2.158
(Max.: 21. 504)
3.733 ± 1.364
(Max.: 12.755)
40%
0.853 ± 0.337
(Max.: 1.990)
6.634 ± 1.919
(Max.: 18.928)
3.164 ± 1.398
(Max.: 13.693)
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF
(
MEDIAN ± STANDARD DEVIATION
2
)
, AND THE MAXIMUM OF
l∞ NORM OF THE ESTIMATION ERROR OF α FROM 100 MONTE CARLO
RUNS, FOR UNOBSERVABLE PMU PLACEMENT SETTING, IN DEGREES
Spoofed
PMU % Proposed Vanfretti et al.[18]
10%
0.218 ± 0.147
(Max.: 1.461)
4.470 ± 1.967
(Max.: 23.220)
20%
0.703 ± 0.210
(Max.: 2.133)
5.691 ± 2.127
(Max.: 24.768)
30%
0.678 ± 0.179
(Max.: 1.839)
4.511 ± 1.598
(Max.: 18.161)
40%
0.809 ± 0.177
(Max.: 1.867)
4.389 ± 1.578
(Max.: 16.366)
the percentage of spoofed PMUs in each zone remains less
than half of the number of PMUs in the zone. Therefore the
attacks we test here are identifiable based on Theorem III.2
and thus the sparse error correction algorithm can identify and
correct them well. In addition, we present similar experiments
on IEEE-300 bus test network, in the Appendix III of the
supplementary material.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a sparse error correction frame-
work for mitigating GPS spoofing attacks on PMUs. Our attack
identifiability analysis provides a detailed characterization of
how PMU locations affect the grid resilience to spoofing
attacks. The proposed error correction algorithm is scalable
because it only requires solving a least squares problem for
a single zone in each iteration. It outperformed benchmarks
in mitigating GPS spoofing attacks on PMUs. Overall, our
results imply that we can mitigate spoofing attacks much more
effectively by properly leveraging their sparse nature.
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9APPENDIX I
ALTERNATIVE MEASUREMENT MODEL
In this section we present the proof for Proposition III.1
stated in Section III
First we will show that the spoofed voltage angle mea-
surements of PMU in bus i denoted by w¯∠Vi can be directly
obtained from z¯, using the definition of w¯∠Vi , shown as below:
w¯∠Vi = ∠z¯Vi . (31)
Next we will show that the angle difference of voltage phase
angles between bus i ∈ T and bus l ∈ Mi denoted by w¯∆θil
can be derived using z¯.
Using (1) and (4a), we can model the spoofed voltage
measurement from PMU k in bus i as shown below:
z¯Vi = e
jαk(|xi|ejθi) = |xi|ej(αk+θi). (32)
Note that αk is nonzero if PMU k is under spoofing attack
and αk is zero otherwise.
Using (2) and (4b), we can write down the current measure-
ments in line from bus i ∈ T to bus l ∈Mi as below,
z¯Iil =e
jαk((yil + j
bsil
2
)|xi|ejθi − yil|xl|ejθl)
=(yil + j
bsil
2
)|xi|ej(θi+αk) − yil|xl|ej(θl+αk).
(33)
Now using (32) and (33), we can write z¯Vi z¯
∗
Iil
as below:
z¯Vi z¯
∗
Iil
= |xi|ej(αk+θi)(y∗il − j
bsil
2
)|xi|e−j(θi+αk)
− |xi|ej(αk+θi)y∗il|xl|e−j(θl+αk))
= (y∗il − j
bsil
2
)|xi|2 − y∗il|xi||xl|ej(θi−θl)).
|xl|ej(θi−θl)) =
(y∗il − j b
s
il
2 )|xi|2 − z¯Vi z¯∗Iil
y∗il|xi|
(34)
Since |xi| is directly measured from PMU at bus i, |xi| =
|zVi |. So we can rewrite the above euqation as
|xl|ej(θi−θl)) =
(y∗il − j b
s
il
2 )|zVi |2 − z¯Vi z¯∗Iil
y∗il|zVi |
(35)
Now we can write θi − θl, the angle difference of voltage
phasors between bus i and bus l denoted by w¯∆θil as
w¯∆θil = θi − θl = ∠(
(y∗il − j b
s
il
2 )|zVi |2 − z¯Vi z¯∗Iil
y∗il
) (36)
Thus we prove that there exists a mapping T (·) such that
w¯ = T (z¯), where w¯ is the concatenation of w¯∠Vi and w¯∆θil
for all i ∈ T and l ∈Mi.
APPENDIX II
IDENTIFIABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present proofs for the theorems, lemmas
and propositions we have presented on identifiability analysis
in Section III.
A. Proof for Lemma III.1
Proof. Suppose α satisfies ‖α‖0 < 12 Cospark(H∠V B∆) and
that α is not identifiable. Then by Proposition III.2, there exists
α¯ 6= α such that ‖α¯‖0 ≤ ‖α‖0 and,
α− α¯ ∈ R(H∠V B∆). (37)
This implies that,
‖α− α¯‖0 ≤ ‖α‖0 + ‖α¯‖0
≤ 2‖α‖0
< Cospark(H∠V B∆)
However, since α − α¯ ∈ R(H∠V B∆) we have ‖α −
α¯‖0 ≥ Cospark(H∠V B∆), which contradicts with the above
inequality. Therefore, α should be identifiable.
B. Proof of Proposition III.3
Proof. Since H∆ ∈ R(m−K)×N is a block matrix with the
special block structure as follows,
H∆ =

H
(1)
∆ 0 . . . 0
0 H
(2)
∆ . . . 0
... . . .
...
0 0 . . .H
(Γ)
∆
 ,
we can describe its null space as:
N(H∆) = {β ∈ RN : H∆β = 0}
=

β
(1)
...
β(Γ)
 ∈ RN : H(γ)∆ β(γ) = 0, ∀γ
 (38)
Above equation implies that,
β ∈ N(H∆) ⇐⇒ β(γ) ∈ N(H(γ)∆ ), ∀γ ∈ {1, . . . ,Γ} (39)
Therefore, we can derive a basis matrix of N(H∆) denoted by
B∆ with a similar block structure, having zero off diagonal
blocks and γ-th diagonal block B(γ)∆ being the basis matrix of
N(H
(γ)
∆ ), as shown below:
B∆ =

B
(1)
∆ 0 . . . 0
0 B
(2)
∆ . . . 0
... . . .
...
0 0 . . .B
(Γ)
∆
 .
Now let us prove that B(γ)∆ is the N
(γ)- dimensional
vector with all entries equal to one. Recall that H(γ)∆ ∈
R(m(γ)−K(γ))×N(γ) where m(γ),K(γ) and N (γ) are the num-
ber of measurements from Zone γ, number of PMUs in Zone
γ and number of buses in Zone γ, respectively. Suppose that
b ∈ RN(γ) is a vector in N(H(γ)∆ ), i.e.,
H
(γ)
∆ b = 0
According to the definition, each row of H(γ)∆ consists of
exactly two nonzero entries which are equal in magnitude but
opposite in sign. Each column corresponds to a bus in Zone
γ. Let the nonzero entries of row i of H(γ)∆ are located in
column k and column l. Then for each row i of the matrix,
H
(γ)
∆ [i, :]b = 0,b 6= 0 ⇐⇒ bk = bl, (40)
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where H(γ)∆ [i, :] denotes the row i of matrix H∆ and bk
denotes the entry k of vector b. Furthermore, from the
definition of a zone, there exists a path between any two
nodes in the subgraph corresponding to a particular zone. This
implies that, (40) has to be true for any entry k and l in the
vector b. Therefore b = b¯ · 1N(γ) where b¯ is a scalar. Thus
we prove that N(H(γ)∆ ) has dimension one and the basis for
the null space is in fact the following:
B
(γ)
∆ = 1N(γ) .
C. Proof of Lemma III.2
Proof. Since both H∠V and B∆ are block matrices with off
diagonal blocks being zero matrices, H∠V B∆ is also a block
matrix as shown below:
H∠V B∆ =

H
(1)
∠V 0 . . . 0
0 H
(2)
∠V . . . 0
... . . .
...
0 0 . . .H
(Γ)
∠V


B
(1)
∆ 0 . . . 0
0 B
(2)
∆ . . . 0
... . . .
...
0 0 . . .B
(Γ)
∆

=

H
(1)
∠V B
(1)
∆ 0 . . . 0
0 H
(2)
∠V B
(2)
∆ . . . 0
... . . .
...
0 0 . . .H
(Γ)
∠V B
(Γ)
∆
 ,
(41)
where H(γ)∠V and B
(γ)
∆ are the blocks of H∠V and B∆
corresponding to each zone γ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Γ}. Now it is easy
to see that the sparsity level of the sparsest nonzero vector in
R(H∠V B∆) is the smallest sparsity level among the sparsest
nonzero vectors in R(H(γ)∠V B
(γ)
∆ ) of all zones γ ∈ {1, . . . ,Γ}.
Therefore by the definition of cospark of a matrix, we can
prove the statement in the Lemma, i.e.,
Cospark (H∠V B∆) = min
γ∈{1,2,...,Γ}
Cospark(H(γ)∠V B
(γ)
∆ ).
D. Proof of Lemma III.3
Proof. We directly prove the claim in this Lemma by lever-
aging Proposition III.3 and the special sparsity structure of
H
(γ)
∠V ∈ RK
(γ)×N(γ) . If y is a nonzero vector in R(H(γ)∠V B
(γ)
∆ ),
then there exists a nonzero c ∈ R such that,
y = H
(γ)
∠V B
(γ)
∆ c
= H
(γ)
∠V 1N(γ)c ,
(42)
where the last equation is due to Proposition III.3. Further-
more, by the definition of H(γ)∠V , each row of this matrix
corresponds to a particular voltage angle measurement from a
PMU deployed in bus i ∈ T(γ) from Zone γ, and consists of all
zeros except for the value one in the column corresponding to
bus i. Due to this structure of H(γ)∠V , we can say the following:
H
(γ)
∠V 1N(γ) = 1K(γ) ,
where K(γ) is the number of PMUs in Zone γ. Thus by
substituting this in (42) we get,
y = 1K(γ)c
This implies that for any nonzero y ∈ R(H(γ)∠V B(γ)∆ ), ‖y‖0 =
K(γ) Hence, from the definition of cospark,
Cospark(H(γ)∠V B
(γ)
∆ ) = K
(γ).
E. Proof of Theorem III.1
Proof. First we directly prove the implications of the inequal-
ity in the Theorem by leveraging Lemma III.1, Lemma III.2
and Lemma III.3. Suppose that α satisfies the following:
‖α‖0 < 12 Cospark(H∠V B∆)
Then from Lemma III.1, α is identifiable. By applying
Lemma III.2 and Lemma III.3,
Cospark(H∠V B∆) = min{1,2,...,Γ}
Cospark(H(γ)∠V B
(γ)
∆ )
= min
{1,2,...,Γ}
K(γ)
= Kmin,
where Kmin = min
1,2,...,Γ}
K(γ), i.e., the smallest number of
PMUs in a zone in the network. Since the sparsity of α only
takes integer values, we can rewrite the inequality and state
that if,
‖α‖0 ≤ dKmin2 − 1e,
then α is identifiable. Therefore this proves the first statement
in Theorem III.1.
Now we will prove the converse statement. Let x ∈ CN be
an arbitrary state vector. We will prove that there exists α with
‖α‖0 = dKmin2 −1e+1 that is not identifiable for the state x.
In particular we explicitly construct α as follows. Without loss
of generality we assume that Zone 1 in the network has the
smallest number of PMUs. For legibility, let κ = (dKmin2 −
1e+ 1). Then we define each entry i of α(1) as follows:
α(1)[i] =
{
a if i = 1, . . . , κ
0 if i = κ+ 1, . . . ,K(1)
where a is a nonzero constant. Furthermore, each entry of α(γ)
for the rest of the zones γ ∈ {2, . . . , Z} are set to zero, i.e.:
α(γ)[i] = 0 if γ ∈ {2, . . . ,Γ}
Let noiseless measurements z¯, denote the measurements gen-
erated by this α and an arbitrary state vector x, i.e., z¯ =
Φ(α)Hx.
In order to show that α is not identifiable for x, we will
prove existence of α¯ 6= α and x¯ satisfying,
(i) ‖α¯‖0 ≤ ‖α‖0, and
(ii) Φ(α)Hx = Φ(α¯)Hx¯
We define α¯ 6= α by only altering entries of α corresponding
to Zone 1. Specifically as below:
α¯(γ) =
{
α(1) − a · 1Kmin if γ = 1
α(γ) if γ ∈ {2, . . . ,Γ} (43)
And define state x¯ by only altering entries of x corresponding
to Zone 1. Specifically
x¯(γ) =
{
ej·a · x(1) if γ = 1
x(γ) if γ ∈ {2, . . . ,Γ} (44)
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Let the measurements generated by (x¯, α¯) be z¯. Due to
the decomposibility of PMU measurements (20), the spoofed
measurements in Zone γ for γ ∈ {2, . . . ,Γ}, can be given as
below,
z¯(γ) = Φγ(α¯
(γ))H(γ)x¯(γ)
= Φγ(α
γ)H(γ)x(γ)
where last equality is due to (43) and (44). Therefore,
z¯(γ) = z¯(γ) for γ ∈ {2, . . . ,Γ}.
Now let us analyse z¯(1) generated from attack α¯ and state x¯
based on (32) and (33). For PMU k deployed in bus i ∈ T(1)
and l ∈Mi :
z¯Vi = |xi|ej(α¯k+θ¯i) = |xi|ej((αk−a)+(θi+a)) = |xi|ej(αk+θi)
= z¯Vi
z¯Iil = (yil + j
bsil
2
)|xi|ej(θ¯i+α¯k) − yil|xl|ej(θ¯l+α¯k)
= (yil + j
bsil
2
)|xi|ej((θi+a)+(αk−a))
− yil|xl|ej((θl+a)+(αk−a))
= z¯Iil
Thus we have shown that z¯ = z¯ Furthermore, by the definition
of α¯;
α¯(1)[i] =
{
0 if i ∈ {1, . . . , κ}
−a otherwise
and α¯(γ) = 0 for all γ ∈ {2, . . . ,Γ}. Therefore,
‖α¯‖0 = Kmin − κ
= Kmin − (dKmin2 − 1e+ 1)
= dKmin−12 − 1e+ 1≤ ‖α‖0
Hence from Definition III.1, this attack α is not identifiable.
Thus we have proved that given any state x there exists an
unidentifiable attack α with sparsity level dKmin2 −1e+1).
F. Proof of Theorem III.2
Proof. Let x be an arbitrary state vector x ∈ CN and α be
an arbitrary attack vector satisfying,
‖α(γ)‖0 ≤ dK
(γ)
2
− 1e, (45)
for all z ∈ {1, . . . ,Γ}. We will prove that α is identifiable for
x using the proof-by-contradiction approach.
Suppose that α is unidentifiable for x. Then, the contra-
positive of Proposition III.1 implies that there exists α¯ 6= α
such that (i) α¯ ≤ α and (ii) α− α¯ ∈ R(H∠V B∆). Because
‖α¯‖0 ≤ ‖α‖0 and α 6= α¯, there exists γ¯ ∈ {1, . . . ,Γ} such
that ‖α¯(γ¯)‖0 ≤ ‖α(γ¯)‖0 and α¯(γ¯) 6= α(γ¯). Then from the
triangle inequality,
‖α(γ¯) − α¯(γ¯)‖0 ≤ ‖α(γ¯)‖0 + ‖α¯(γ¯)‖0 (46)
Furthermore,
‖α¯(γ¯)‖0 ≤ 2‖α(γ¯)‖0
≤ 2dK(γ¯)2 − 1e,
(47)
where the first inequality is due to the existence of γ¯ ∈
{1, . . . ,Γ} such that ‖α¯(γ¯)‖0 ≤ ‖α(γ¯)‖0 and the last inequal-
ity is due to the assumption (45).
Furthermore, due to the block structure of H∠V B∆ de-
scribed in (22), α−α¯ ∈ R(H∠V B∆) implies that α(γ¯)−α¯(γ¯)
is in R(H(γ¯)∠V B
(γ¯)
∆ ). Therefore,
α(γ¯) − α¯(γ¯) ∈ R(H(γ¯)∠V B(γ¯)∆ ).
Since α(γ¯) - α¯(γ¯) is a nonzero vector in R(H(γ¯)∠V B
(γ¯)
∆ ), the
definition of Cospark(R(H(γ¯)∠V B
(γ¯)
∆ )) implies that,
‖α(γ¯) − α¯(γ¯)‖0 ≥ Cospark(H(γ¯)∠V B(γ¯)∆ ).
From Lemma III.3 we have Cospark(R(H(γ¯)∠V B
(γ¯)
∆ )) = K
(γ¯).
Therefore, the above inequality can be rewritten as follows:
‖α(γ¯) − α¯(γ¯)‖0 ≥ K(γ¯).
This contradicts with (47), thereby proving the theorem state-
ment.
Now we will prove the converse statement. Let x ∈ CN
be an arbitrary state vector and γ¯ ∈ {1, ...,Γ} be an arbitrary
zone. We will prove that there exists α with (i) ‖α(γ¯)‖0 =
dK(γ¯)2 −1e+1 and ‖α(γ)‖0 ≤ dK
(γ)
2 −1e, for γ ∈ {1, . . . ,Γ}\{γ¯}, and (ii) α is not identifiable for the state x. In particular
we explicitly construct such α as follows. For legibility, let
κ := (dK(γ¯)2 − 1e + 1). Then we set the entries of α(γ¯) as
follows:
α(γ¯)[i] =
{
a if i = 1, . . . , κ
0 if i = κ+ 1, . . . ,K(γ¯)
where a is a nonzero constant. Furthermore, for every
γ ∈ {1, . . . ,Γ} \ {γ¯} we set α(γ) to be an arbitrary
K(γ)−dimensional vector satisfying ‖α(γ)‖0 ≤ dK(γ)2 − 1e.
Let noiseless measurements z¯, denote the measurements
generated by this α and an arbitrary state vector x, i.e., z¯ =
Φ(α)Hx.
In order to show that α is not identifiable for x, we will
prove existence of α¯ 6= α and x¯ satisfying,
(i) ‖α¯‖0 ≤ ‖α‖0, and
(ii) Φ(α)Hx = Φ(α¯)Hx¯
We define α¯ = [(α¯(1))T , . . . , (α¯(Z))T ]T by only altering the
entries of α corresponding to Zone γ¯ as below:
α¯(γ) =
{
α(γ¯) − a · 1K(γ¯) if γ = γ¯
α(γ) if γ ∈ {1, . . . ,Γ} \ {γ¯}
(48)
And define state x¯ by only altering entries of x corresponding
to Zone γ¯. Specifically,
x¯(γ) =
{
ej·a · x(γ¯) if γ = γ¯
x(γ) if γ ∈ {1, . . . ,Γ} \ {γ¯} (49)
Due to the decomposibility of PMU measurements (20), the
spoofed measurements in Zone γ for γ ∈ {1, . . . ,Γ} \ {γ¯},
can be given as below,
z¯(γ) = Φγ(α¯
(γ))H(γ)x¯(γ)
= Φγ(α
γ)H(γ)x(γ)
where last equality is due to (48) and (49). Therefore,
z¯(γ) = z¯(γ) for γ ∈ {1, . . . ,Γ} \ {γ¯}.
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Now let us analyse z¯(γ¯) generated from attack α¯ and state x¯
based on (32) and (33). For PMU k deployed in bus i ∈ T(γ¯)
and l ∈Mi :
z¯Vi = |xi|ej(α¯k+θ¯i) = |xi|ej((αk−a)+(θi+a)) = |xi|ej(αk+θi)
= z¯Vi
z¯Iil = (yil + j
bsil
2
)|xi|ej(θ¯i+α¯k) − yil|xl|ej(θ¯l+α¯k)
= (yil + j
bsil
2
)|xi|ej((θi+a)+(αk−a))
− yil|xl|ej((θl+a)+(αk−a))
= z¯Iil
Thus we have shown that z¯ = z¯ Furthermore, by the definition
of α¯;
α¯(γ¯)[i] =
{
0 if i = 1, . . . , κ
−a if i = κ+ 1, . . . ,K(γ¯)
Therefore,
‖α¯(γ¯)‖0 = K(γ¯) − κ
= K(γ¯) − (dK(γ¯)2 − 1e+ 1)
≤ (dK(γ¯)−12 − 1e+ 1)
≤ ‖α(γ¯)‖0
Due to the above inequality together with the fact that α¯(γ) =
α(γ) for all γ ∈ {1, . . . ,Γ} \ {γ¯}, implies that
‖α¯‖0 ≤ ‖α‖0
Hence from Definition III.1, this attack α is unidentifiable.
APPENDIX III
SIMULATION RESULTS ON IEEE-300 BUS TEST NETWORK
In this section we demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed sparse error correction method on the IEEE-300 bus
test network. Figure 3 illustrates the PMU locations of IEEE-
300 bus network used for the experimental purpose, when the
network is observable from PMU measurements. As described
in Figure 3, this placement setting naturally induces six zones
in the network, with 20, 11, 20, 13, 23 and 16 PMUs in
Zone 1 to Zone 6 respectively. The measurement generation
was performed similar to the experiments on IEEE RTS-96
network, as described in Section V. The Table III presents
the median, standard deviation and the maximum value of the
maximum absolute attack estimation error ‖αˆ− α‖∞ metric
from 100 Monte Carlo runs, for various percentages of the
spoofed PMUs in an observable PMU placement setting. The
results follow a similar trend to the IEEE RTS-96 test network,
which further affirms the efficacy of the proposed sparse error
correction approach.
Fig. 3. Observable PMU placement in IEEE-300 test network and the six
zones induced by these PMUs.
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF
(
MEDIAN ± STANDARD DEVIATION
2
)
, AND THE MAXIMUM OF
l∞ NORM OF THE ESTIMATION ERROR OF α FROM 100 MONTE CARLO
RUNS, FOR OBSERVABLE PMU PLACEMENT SETTING, IN DEGREES
Spoofed
PMU % Proposed Risbud et al.[16]
Vanfretti et al.
[18]
10%
0.879 ± 0.145
(Max.: 1.584)
6. 682 ± 2.625
(Max.: 23.8574)
17.590 ± 5.786
(Max.: 80.920)
20%
1.074± 0.163
(Max.: 2.361)
10.331± 3.129
(Max.: 26.619 )
15.138 ± 4.753
(Max.: 54.985 )
30%
1.222 ± 1.923
(Max.: 22.756)
15.764±2.754
(Max.: 25.850 )
17.549 ± 5.484
(Max.: 76.824)
40%
1.471± 4.057
(Max.: 23.734)
17.391 ± 2.313
(Max.: 31.350 )
15.361 ± 4.310
(Max.: 46.991 )
